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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 3-18-80, resporrlent filed a suit against appellant for the

recovery of earned but unµi.id insurance premiums .
after properly served with process.

Defendants v.ere there-

Prior to the initiation of the action,

resp:mdent, through its attorney, wrote to appillant Mmmtain West Transr:ortation Canµi.ny derranding the amount due and gave appellants until 3-7-80
to !EY or make arrangsnents to µi.y the unpaid insurance premiums.

No response vas received fran appellants.

(R. 37)

(R. 39)

After the filing of

the action, an agent of appellant, I:avid Stannard, met with Steven Wisaran
of respondent.

(R. 32)

According to Wisenan, the t\\O µirties did agree

as to an amount due unless several checks issued by appellant to respoodent
in fact cleared appellant's tank, which they did not.

36)

(R. 32, 33, 35 and

Pursuant to instructions fran Wisenan, respondent's attorney wrote

another letter to Stannard on or alx>ut 3-21-80.

(R. 40-42)

said letter

specifically stated that respcndent vas going to m01Te forward expeditiously
with its legal action against appellants i.mless certain minor details were
'.>Drked out with respondent's attorney.
never contacted.

(R. 37)

(R. 42)

Respondent's attorney was

Therefore, a default judgment was entered 5-7-80.

In respcnse to appellants' Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment an

untranscril:Ed hearing was held 8-28-80 refore the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.
Appellants' motion v.es argued to and denied by Judge Rigtrup by order dated
9-8-80.
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Steven Wissren in his affidavit (R. 32-33) and respondent's attorney
in his affidavit (R. 37-38) roth denied ever agreeing to or statinq that the
lawsuit would not be pursued, which fact is substantiated by copies of
respondent's attorney's letters mentioned al:ove.

THE LOWER COURT' DID Nor ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUS~ 'ID SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUD3MENT
A great number of cases have been previously decided by this court
regarding the setting aside of default judqments.

It is not the intent

of this brief to exhaustively review or research this area of the law,
inasmuch as the =urt is very familiar with tre general law regarding these
cases.

The case law is very clear in showing that the lower court in the

case at bar did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate respondent's
judgment.
A closer look at the cases cited in appellant's brief shows that
tre Utah SUpr6lle Court has only overruled the discretion of trial courts
in cases of obvious error.

For example, in Locke v. Petersen, 3 Utah 2d 415,

285 P.2d llll, this court overturned the lower court in a case where confusion was created by a defendant's not teing served with an exact copy of
the original surrmons.

In that case, the Utah supreme Court stated, ;{rt is)

,

our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default jtrlgments shollld
te set aside to allow trial on the merits." Id. at lll3 of P.2d.

There

was no uncertainty in tre case at bar other than that created by appellants'
failure to respond to the clear lanquage of the surrmons (R. 5-Bl and of the
letters sent by respondent's attorney.
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In 1962, in the case of Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Cgnpany, 14 Utah

2d 52, 376 P.2d 951, a case also cited in appellant's brief, this court held
ttat the default judgment srould have been set aside by the 10\\er =urt
where there was a showing that process was served upon a party who had
previously sent notices of resignation of his corporate ca:pacity to other
parties involved with the corporate defendant.

J!..s with the previously dis-

cussed case, there was a potential problem with process.

This =urt stated

the general rule that trial courts are endowed with considerable discreticn
in these matters as long as they do not act arbitrarily.

Judge Rigtrup did not act arbitrarily.

Id. at 952 of P.2d.

Appellants merely chose to put their

resf€ci:ive heads in the sand and to disregard written notices and

SU'llllCrlS.

Also cited in appellants' brief was the case of Central Finance Cgm::any
v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P.2d 316.

Both parties were represented

by =unsel but defendant's counsel and defendant failed to appear for a

trial and a default was accordingly entered.

The issue was whether or not

the clerk had properly notified the defendant and his attorney of the trial
date.

There are none of the glaring problems in the case at bar as with

the previously discussed cases.
This court in June of 1979 handed dOWl. a decision which sets forth
clear guidelines for decisions such as this.

Heath v. Mo\Er, 597 P. 2d 855'

was a case in which the defendant moved the 10\\er court to set aside a default
judgrrent entered against him for fraudulent misrepresentaticn.

The actual

facts of the case differ rrarkedly fran the case at bar, but the =urt in
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uph:>lding the lower court's refusal to set aside the default judgment in
its dicta set clear criteria for deciding this matter.

The court stated,

Whether a trial court should set aside a default judorrent
is largely a discretionary matter, and we will reverse a
court's ruling cnly i f it is clear the court abused that
discretion ... Id. at 858 of P. 2d.
The court also quoted one of its previous decisions (Airken Intennountain,
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P. 2d 431) in putting the l::llrden on the
mJVing party to set aside a default.

The moving party "must show that he

has used du= diligence and that he \>las prevented fran appearing by circumstances over which he had no control."
original).

Id. at 859.

(Emphasis in the

Appellants in the case at bar did not use "due diligence" and

were in no \>lay prevented fran appearing.

In fact, respondent gave appel-

lants mJre wamings than required by statute.
W3rren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Ut. 416, 260 P.2d 741, was a case
in which this court upheld the lower court's refusal to set aside a default
judgment in a quiet title action.

The court held that more was needed than

a statement by the moving party that defenses were available and that the
rroving party had lost his day in court. Id. at 744 of P.2d.

In that case,

this court felt that the loi.er court very well could, in its discretion,
have set aside the default, but in refusing to reverse the lower court's
refusal to set aside the default the court held as follows:
Appellants' conduct is not entirely inexcusable and .
the trial court could have, in its discretion, set aside
the judgment; but, on the other hand, respondent and the
trial court -....ere justified in believing that appellants
had abandoned their defense. The rule that the courts
will incline towards granting relief to a party who has not
had opportunity to present his case is ordinarily applied
at the trial court level, and this court will not reverse

-4-
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the trial =urt where it aPfe&s ... that all elerrents ¥.ere
considered, rrerely because the motion could have teen
granted. This court will not sub>titute its discretion
for that of the trial court in a case such as this. Id,
at 744 of P.2d.
~
Ap:i;:ellants are asking this court to exercise equitable pcll'.ers available mly to the 10\\er court.

As in the Warren, supra, decision, there

has been no abuse of discretion and this court's equitable juQ;irrent should
not be substituted for that of Jucge Rigtrup.

CCNCLUSION
Plaintiff-resp:mdent respectively concludes that the foregoing cases
clearly srow that defendant-ap:i;:ellant failed ooth l::efore the lower cc:A.Jrt
and particularly before this court to carry its burden of setting aside
the default judgment.

That is p:irticularly true where no transcript of the

trial court proceedings was rrade. . Respondent warned appellant throu;rh tw
different letters of its intention of llOVing forward.
ignore these warnings.

Appellant chose to

In fact, it was not until a writ of Executicn

was

served up:m Mr. Charles A. Boyntcn, president of ooth defendants, that
any action at all took place by appellants.

(R. 14).

This fact further

sup:pJrts respcndent' s cla.il!ls, because appellants did nothing fran the
rreeting in March until 5-15-80, despite appellant's cla:im that ongoing
negotiations ....ere taking place.
There was no arose of discretion by the lower court.

It is sul::rnitted

that this court should not substitute its judgnent for that of Judge Rigtrup,
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even if the judges of this court might have cane to a different conclusiCTl
had they been sitting in Judge Rigtrup' s chair on August 28, 1980.
Therefore, the lov.er court's ruling should

re

upheld and the judgnent

should not be set aside.

Respectfully suhnitted,

Mikel M. Boley
BIACKHAM & BOLEY

Attorney for Resp:indent
3535 south 3200 vest
west Valley City, Utah 84119
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foregoing Respondent's Brief v.ere rrailed, postage prep:i.id, this

of January, 1980, to:
WATKISS & CTMPBELL
E. Barney Gesas
310 South r-ti.in, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendants-Ap:r:ellants
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